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WHEN Kichard Avenarius, Professor of Philosophy at the
University, died at Zurich on 18th August, 1896, only a
very small circle of philosophers and pupils knew what a
powerful mind had been snatched from amongst them; for
he was a man whose unique thought was unappreciated by
his contemporaries solely because it was unique, and
diverged too much from what was previously familiar.
Concerning the life of this philosopher I will merely state
briefly that he was born at Paris, 19th November, 1843, that
he first devoted himself (by his father's wish) to the book
trade, but afterwards studied—for the most part philosophy
—at Zurich, Berlin, and Leipzig ; in 1876 he attached him-
self to the University of Leipzig, and in 1877 was called as
Professor of Philosophy to Zurich. In 1877 he instituted,
with the help of C. Goering, M. Heinze, and W. Wundt, the
Vierteljahrssch/rift fur vnssenschaftliche Philosophie and con-
tinued it until his death, latterly with the help of M. Heinze
and Al Kiehl.2 In addition to several smaller contributions
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to this periodical, Avenarius published Ueber die beiden ersten
Phasen des Spinozischen Pantheismus und das Verhdltnisder zwei-
ten und dritten Phase, nebst einem Anhang vher Reihenfolge und
Abfassungszeit der cUteren Schriften Spinoza's (Leipzig, 1868);
Philosophic cds Denken der Welt gemass dem Prinzip des kleinsten
Kraftmaasses, Prolegomena zu einer Kritik der reinen Erfa.hrung
(Leipzig, 1876); Kritik der reinen Erfahrung (Leipzig, 1888-
90); Der menschliche Weltbegriff (Leipzig, 1891).
In his principal work, the Kritik der reinen Erfahrung,
Avenarius first makes the attempt to describe all theoretical
activity, in itself and in its relation to practical activity
(which he also describes more generally) as conditioned by
analytically determined changes of the nervous central
organ. In this way he arrives at a formal and general
theory of human knowledge and action ; he endeavours to
limit scientific philosophy critically to the descriptive
definition of the general idea of experience in its form and
context. The following pages, composed at the request of
the Editor of MIND, aim at giving a short survey of the new
theory, without pretending to exhaust the rich material, or
to deal with questions raised in recent discussions.
The best proof of the importance of a theory must be its
fruitfulness. But a system so strikingly original as that of
Avenarius, and starting from such completely new points of
view, contains the promise of great fruitfulness in the mere
fact that it directs us into new ways, opens out new per-
spectives, and shows how it is possible to get quite a new
light upon the old problems which are constantly being
turned over and over in the same way. This must always
have a refreshing and stimulating effect.
Prof. Max Miiller has remarked in his Gifford Lectures
that the human mind has been slowly compelled to admit its
entire incapacity and ignorance as regards the relations of the
noumenal and the phenomenal. Avenarius has once more
removed this agnosticism. He showed that this incapacity
and ignorance existed only because the whole problem had
been wrongly stated, and that Philosophy had run into a
cul-de-sac from which she had so far vainly sought an issue.
And thus he constructed a theory which not only satisfied
the demand that it should be in itself theoretically valid and
logical, but which at the same time harmonised with practice
and with the common-sense view of the universe.
Avenarius called his theory " Empiriokritizismus ". What
does this name mean ?
The elements from which the word is compounded are
Empiricism and Criticism. As in natural science, and to
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some extent also in the art of medicine, philosophical
empiricism will accept nothing but experience, and will
build upon no other basis; but it forgets to determine
accurately the concept of experience from which it starts.
The "critical empiricism" which, since Hume, has set
about its work more cautiously, looks for the universal
element in experience; it tries to find how far we can
attain through experience to universal and necessary know-
ledge, or how far we are forced, by a speculative construc-
tion upon the basis of experience, to supplement it by
logical inferences. " Criticism," finally, has for its aim,
since Kant's time, to establish critically the possibility of
knowledge, no matter whether it leads us to a positive or
negative result.
Empiriocriticism, on the other hand, takes up the position
that everything is experience when it has been stated as
experienced by an individual—though it may be that
primarily it is only experience for this one individual in
question. (If, e.y., a child states that it has seen angels,
then the angels are an experience for the child.) But
then we investigate the difference between this concept
of experience which is valid for the individual and
the concept of experience which is universally valid
(interindimduell gilltig). Thus empiriocriticism also ap-
proaches experience critically, but it does not determine its
concept of experience beforehand; it begins by admitting
everything as experience, provided only that it is at the
moment predicated and characterised as experience by an
individual. It does not arbitrarily limit its sphere, but
says: If I am to approach experience critically, then I
must include in the object of my investigation all pre-
dications which contain an experience; I must not pre-
judge the question of true and false, for the decision as to
that can only follow from the theory.
Empiriocriticism is then not empiricism; moreover, it
approaches its task purely speculatively (in the good sense
of this much-abused word), although it builds entirely upon
the results of the natural sciences. This speculative charac-
ter may be frankly conceded without fear of confusion with
the speculative method of metaphysics. The speculation in
the empiriocritical theory does not extend to the contents of
knowledge and experience, but to their universal form. Only
the speculative investigation of the contents of knowledge
has proved itself to be unfruitful and unscientific.
The Kritik der reinen Erfahrung is not only a theory of
experience, but, inasmuch as experience is a species of
452 FBIEDEICH CABSTANJEN:
the genus knowledge, it is also a theory of knowledge.
And while in all special theories of knowledge philosophers
endeavour to develop what in particular they mean by
knowledge, Avenarius, on the contrary, aims only at pre-
senting the common normal element in all such theories,
the universal norms according to which individuals deter-
mine Being and Knowing. Ultimately, therefore, the
Kritik der reinen Erfahrung is not only a general theory
of knowledge, it is also a general theory of human norms.
What, then, is the standpoint from which the Kritik
starts? It is not that of a preassumed and dogmatically
determined experience, upon which is based the critique of
all philosophical or other scientific or prescientific concepts.
On the contrary, it is so general that Avenarius cannot
describe it better than by saying: my standpoint is purely
local. He includes no other standpoint than that where
he stands, purely locally in the midst of his surroundings.
As Greek tradition says of the philosopher, he stands
in the throng of the market-place, not as buyer or seller, but
as beholder of all the traffic; he passes through distant lands
and mingles with strange peoples, not for the sake of any
business, mean or lofty, but in order that he may observe.
We must, however, have some presupposition from which
to proceed. That to this presupposition and to its being
rightly presented great importance attaches, will be clear
to every philosophical reader; everything depends upon the
presupposition; if this the foundation of the building does
not stand firm, the whole erection will totter.
In stating his presupposition Avenarius begins by banish-
ing from it everything which belongs to particular and specific
philosophical tendencies, and which may be regarded as
variations of a proposition originally accepted by all men.
Thus he proceeded to abstract what had been first in-
troduced into his own view of the universe by the fortuitous
and changing influences of life and school, and obtained
the following result:—
" I, with all my thoughts and feelings, found myself in the
midst of an environment. This environment was com-
pounded from manifold parts which stood to each other in
manifold relations of dependence. To this environment
belonged also fellow-creatures with their manifold state-
ments ; and what they said for the most part stood again
in a relation of dependence to the environment. For the
rest, my fellow-creatures spoke and acted as I did; they
answered my questions as I answered theirs; they sought
after the various parts of the surrounding or avoided them,
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changed them or sought to maintain them unchanged;
and that which they did or left undone they described with
words, and gave reasons and purposes for deed and omission.
All this they did even as I myself; hence I thought not but
that my fellow-creatures were beings such as myself, and
that I was a being such as they."l
Starting from this first natural idea of the universe,
Avenarius arrived at the fundamental presupposition, which
he has placed at the beginning of his Kritik dcr reincn
Erfahrung, and which runs as follows: "Every human
individual originally accepts over against him an environment
with manifold farts, other human individuals making manifold
statements, and what-is-stated in some way dependent upon the
environment" {Kritik d. r. E., vol. i., p. vii.).
The presupposition of every science is an assumption that
cannot be proved. But just because it cannot be proved, it
must, if it is to serve as the presupposition of a scientific
system, be privileged as an irrefragable axiom; hence it
must not only be as simple and natural as possible, must
not only be theoretically correct in itself, it must also agree,
both in itself and in the consequences to be deduced from
it, with practical life. In one word, it must be not only
logically tenable but also biologically tenable and necessary.
However differently our views of the universe may shape
themselves in detail, they must be based upon this presup-
position as their common and ,most frequently recurring
element. And just because it includes only this common
element, it will have a universality which differs only from
universal validity because, when Psychologies or Philosophies
have changed and troubled their view of the universe, indi-
viduals no longer recognise the presupposition which is
actually a necessary element of their original view of the
universe. But in its fundamental presupposition Empirio-
criticism is not concerned with that which has developed
itself for particular individuals as what to them is logically
tenable, but only with such elements as are most often re-
current in all points of view, and ultimately prove to be
alone biologically tenable.
Does the presupposition with which Avenarius heads his
work satisfy these conditions ? Yes! It is the common
element most often recurring in all views of the universe ; all
are originally based upon it, it belongs to no one specially, it
is undogmatic, theoretically tenable and in harmony with
practical life.
1
 Der menschliclie Weltbeariff, by Richard Avenarius, p. 4. Leipzig:
O. R. Reialand, 1891.
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It may be objected here: How can that be undcgmatic ?
it is the view of a naive Kealism, and how can it also form
a fundamental aspect of Idealism ? Here we might answer:
Even the most advanced idealist originally accepted his
environment as an actually-existent, or as he is wont to
call it " real"; for how would it be possible to designate any-
thing as "appearance," etc., or as "non-existent" if he had
not originally found it confronting him? Nevertheless
Avenarius intentionally omits from his presupposition every
specific characterisation of the environment, such, for instance,
as is undertaken even by a naive Realism. The environment
is not taken either as "phenomenon" or as mere "appearance,"
nor as a "middle" between "being and not-being" or as
"not -be ing" ; but then neither is it taken as "real,"
" actual," or " true ". For the plain man the characterisa-
tion as " actual," " real," does not supervene until he has
busied himself with the opposite concept of a " not-actual" or
"unreal" ; until then, the universe for him is simply there,
and he does not reflect upon the specific characterisation of
this " being-there".
Thus the empiriocritical presupposition is itself a ground
for determining the relation of the " I " to the environment
in such a way that both are present as common and in-
separable elements. Avenarius says: " We find not only our
environment but also ourselves. Our 'I ' is found to be present
just as much as the environment." This interconnexion and
inseparability of the " I " and its surrounding, this essential
and inseparable association and homogeneity of the two co-
ordinated values, is described by Avenarius as the " emjnrio-
kritische Prinzipiallcoordination ".
This co-presentation of the two members, the corporeal
presence of the human being and the spatial presence of the
object, other modern philosophers include in the philosophi-
cal concept of the " I " ; but then they either end in subjec-
tive Idealism, which is a flat contradiction to practical life
and common-sense intuition, or they give a meaning to the
word " I " which it does not possess in our ordinary speech,
and in so doiDg merely add to the confusion of tongues in
the sphere of Philosophy. Is it not better to strike out an
entirely new conception, such as that of essential co-
ordination ? It may be inconvenient—as we have to form
this conception for ourselves—but it is exact, easy to handle,
and fruitful.
Just as other philosophers have regarded the assumption
of a soul as the emanation of some special theory, so
Avenarius regarded such assumptions as are implied in the
RICHARD AVENARIUS. 455
phrase " immediate datum of consciousness ". To start from
" consciousness " or from " thought" as immediately certain
was for him to start from the end. He would have no start-
ing-point except the empiriocritical presupposition. Upon
this alone he constructs his theory as follows:—
He analyses the presupposition and finds that it contains
three members: (1) the environment and its component
parts; (2) fellow-creatures and the self; (3) human state-
ments. Here it becomes necessary to make the reader
acquainted with several symbols introduced by Avenarius.
Every value which is accessible to description, in so far as
it is assumed to be a component part of the environment,
he denotes simply by E. In this sense Avenarius speaks
of things in space, of physiological stimuli, as E-values.
On the other hand, every value accessible to description,
in so far as it is accepted as the content of the statement of
another human individual, is denoted by E. The contents
of statements are E-values.
Finally, that part of the more comprehensive system of
nervous central organs in which are collected the changes
which issue from the periphery, and from which issue all
changes to be passed on to the periphery, is called SYSTEM
C (central system). The more exact anatomical and physio-
logical determination and limitation of this system Avenarius
purposely reserves, because it has not yet been sufficiently
ascertained by the exact sciences, and also because he has
no need of it for his purpose.
If, now, we inquire in what manner the statement-values,
or as we may say, the E-values, are conditioned by individuals
and by the environment (that is, by the E-values), we find
that the statements are conditioned only indirectly by the en-
vironment and its changes, but directly by individuals, and
more especially by their nervous central organ, by System
C and its varying states. But if this is the case the necessity
becomes clear of first analysing these varying states of the
nervous central organ. This is done in the first volume of
the Kritik dcr reinen Erfahrung.
The human individual is assumed to be such that it is
able to maintain itself within certain limits. This relative
maintenance of the individual will be most closely connected
with the maintenance of the most central system, and this
in proportion as the System C is developed according to its
functions. Here there is no attempt to attribute to System C
anything like a striving to maintain itself. In pure description,
without any admixture of metaphysical anthropomorphism,
we can never say an organ strives for something—either for
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stability or for change. We simply affirm the fact that
system C, when subjected to the stimuli which crowd upon
it, does not immediately perish, but maintains itself for a
definite time, not absolutely but with diminutions of its
maintenance ; and after having affirmed that, we can only
state the conditions of the maintenance.
The stimuli from the environment, the B-values, are
primarily to be regarded as threats, as disturbing influences,
as occasions capable of breaking down the maintenance of
system C, and thus we find two values: (1) that of a dis-
turbance of the vital maintenance, and (2) that of a re-approach
to the (ideal) maintenance-maximum.
The greatest conceivable vital maintenance-value must
not be identified with anything like the greatest conceivable
pleasure, or the greatest development of power. Its signifi-
cance is not psychologies,!, but only logical, and as a constant
value is unattainable in life. Psychologically it may be
compared with the Nirvana of Buddhism, which is explained
as the absolute cessation of the bodily and mental activity
which is conjoined with personal existence, as the absolute
rest which the Oriental takes to be the highest pleasure.
In the purely logical significance, in which alone empirio-
criticism uses the value " vital maintenance-maximum," it
signifies only an ideal point, about which the life of the
organism moves in constant oscillations, like the indiffer-
ence-point between pleasure and pain, which also has only
a logico-mathematical significance.
Now, vital disturbance is one of those changes in the
state of the nervous central organ which we have noticed
above, and by which the E-values are directly conditioned.
But this change may be more accurately described ; it
has a special character. If I break a stick, that is chang-
ing it; but the stick never becomes whole again. It is
different with the nervous central organ. When changes
take place in it there are generally present also the condi-
tions which annul the change. Vital disturbance is for the
most part gradually annulled; then the system C approxi-
mates again to its maximum-maintenance. Thus the
change which we have here differs from that in the stick
inasmuch as it consists in an oscillation between two phases,
in deviation from a preliminary value and in approximating
to it again. Thus we have to do with a process of change
which is itself compounded from various changes.
All E-values, the totality of all physiological stimuli, con-
dition the deviations from the vital maximum of mainte-
nance. But what arc the conditions of the annihilation of
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this disturbance, viz., of the re-approach to the maximum of
maintenance ?
The environment, which is primarily hostile, must never-
theless be regarded also as favourable to maintenance, as
maintaining, in so far as it is considered as training the indi-
vidual in habitual modes of behaviour; and this concerns
not only the environment in particular factors, not par-
ticular E-values, but all together. The same stimuli
which condition a vital disturbance, contribute also to
maintenance, and vice versa. Work, for instance, is not
an exclusively destructive factor; while, on the other hand,
nourishment is not an exclusively maintaining factor. This
is proved by the fact that an organism degenerates and
finally perishes just as much when it is merely nourished
(without being subjected to work), as when it merely works
(without being also nourished).
Our maintenance is then conditioned by an equilibrium
between a customary work-process, and a customary nourish-
ment-process. On the other hand, by the preponderance
of the one factor over the other, viz., by an alteration in the
amount of exercise of one of the two factors, a deviation of
system C from this equilibrium of the maintenance-maximum
is given, and this deviation Avenarius calls a vital-difference.
Now this is a very important conception, for by placing
our whole life with all its action and thought in relation to
the vital maintenance-maximum, we can comprehend this
action and thought also in its totality as depending upon
such vital-differences and their annulment. "Life"is not
inaction and rest, but movement; and movement is here
equivalent to continual oscillation about an ideal point of rest.
Thus the process of change in the nervous central organ
begins with the vital-difference; with the annulling of the
vital-difference the process of change in each particular case
attains its end. All the changes which lie between this
beginning and end follow each other immediately; they
form a series, which Avenarius calls the vital-series.
We will first consider the case in which a vital-difference
arises as follows: A uniform increase of nourishment may
take place in some individual, and may then be annulled by
an equally uniform increase of work. Both must be habitual
and familiar to the individual in question, and both together
form a vital-series of the first order.1 Thus the vital-series
of the first order would be composed in this way :—
1
 For the sake of brevity I may here disregard the fact that Avenarius
particularises and describes a third special and concluding term in the
series.
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(1) Habitual increase of nourishment; (2) Habitual increase
of work.
Let us now see what significance that has for our action
and thought. It is unnecessary to deal further wifh the
process of nourishment (I may even assume it to take:
place during the night's sleep); then I have only to ex-
plain more in detail in what the work-process for a vital-
series of the first order consists.
Since this work-process is taken to be completely uniform,
habitual and familiar, its chief characteristic will be that it
excites no attention from us, that we are not conscious of it.
Such a uniform fami .&i increase of work is given to us in
our daily movements, in the'aniount of light, sound, touch
and other stimuli which are daily necessary to us. We
arise from our couch in the morning strengthened and
refreshed by sleep, provided, as we are accustomed to say,
with a certain amount of elasticity; or, to speak in the
more accurate language of empiriocriticism, provided with
a certain uniform habitual increase of nourishment. In this
alone is already contained a vital difference of the first order,
a deviation from the maximum of maintenance. Now in
so far as system G maintains itself, this demands to be
annulled, and for this purpose all the accustomed stimuli of
the environment form conditions for working it off.
Here belong even such uniform and familiar work-values
as the home as such; the size of the room, the colour of the
walls, the ornaments on the wall, domestic arrangements (in
space and time), our parents as the confidential friends with
whom we share"our experiences, the tacitly assumed under-
standing with our fellow-men, their estimation of us, in fact
all the thousand details of manners and intuitions which we
have in common with our surrounding, details which are
really active at every moment, but to which—so long as
they are active—we do not attend at all. In all these we
have most important work-values, which constitute our
"ordinary," if you like "philistine," life, and to a large
extent also the " standard of life," work-values which we
would not and could not do without, but of which we are
not generally conscious until they are absent1
Let us now pass to the second case.
It will not always happen that a given familiar increase of
nourishment will find for its compensation just that increase
of work which is suitable and also familiar. Indeed it hap-
1
 See my introduction to the Kritik d. r. E., under the title : " Richard
Avenarius' biomechanische Orundlegung der neuen allgemeinen Erkennt-
nistheorie," Miinchen, 1894 (p. 119 ft).
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pens only too often in life that an increase of work is given
which has not the value of a familiar one. This unfamiliar
increase of work, then, has the significance of a variation of
vsork.
With this variation of work is introduced a vital-differ-
ence of a higher order, the vital-difference KaT'efo^r.
In so far as system C (and with it the individual) maintains
itself, we must think of it as passing to definite changes of
itself, by means of which the variation in work is annulled;
and these changes will continue until a change supervenes,
such that by it system C again attains for the moment to
its vital maximum of maintenance. That these changes in
sy' tem C are of a most manifold and complicated kind is a
matter of course. That need not prevent us from compre-
hending them for the present under the name " Compen-
sating-adjustments of system C". Thus we are enabled
briefly to review the terms of a vital-series of the higher
order.
It will be composed, e.g., of the following terms: (1)
Habitual increase of nourishment; (2) Habitual increase of
ivork, set for a short time; (3) Variation of work; (4) Compen-
sating adjustments until the vital-difference is completely annulled.
Here again we may consider what significance this series
has for our action and thought. As an instance which in-
dicates all these terms neatly and clearly I select the well-
known one from F. A. Lange's History of Materialism, voL ii.,
p. 370. " A merchant sits comfortably in his arm-chair, and
does not* himself know whether the greater part of his Ego
is occupied with smoking, sleeping, reading the newspaper,
or digesting. A servant enters, bringing a telegram in which
is written : ' Antwerp, etc. Jonas & Co. have failed.' ' Tell
Jacob to harness the horses.' The servant flies. The man
has sprung up, wide awake; he takes a few steps through
his room, goes down into the office, informs his representa-
tive, dictates letters, sends off telegrams, and gets into hia
carriage. The horses snort; he rushes to the bank, to the
exchange, to his business friends—before an hour is over he
is again at home, throwing himself into his arm-chair and
sighing: ' Thank God, I am safe from the worst. Now to
consider further.'"
All that the merchant does and says are for empiriocriticism
E-values, which are conditioned by certain changes in the
system C belonging to the merchant in question. I will
analyse this more fully.
"The merchant sits comfortably in his arm-chair"—we
think of his system C as provided with a uniform habitual
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increase of nourishment (term 1). The characteristic ex-
pression " he himself does not know, etc.," shows us neatly
now the subsequent work-values, being habitual and familiar
(term 2), attract no attention to themselves. It is the usual
cigar which the merchant smokes, it is the usual newspaper
which he reads, familiar in form and type, in its political
views, etc.,—and it is also the familiar environment in which
he finds himself, so familiar that he no longer notices its
arrangement, its component parts and their qualities. As
yet then we are still dealing with a vital-series of the first
order like those mentioned above. (The two first terms of
a vital-series of the higher order coincide with the terms of
a vital-series of the first order.)
Now something fresh intervenes, the telegram: " Jonas
& Co. have failed". "What is now introduced no longer
fits in with the course of a vital-series of the first order as
sketched above (p. 458). An increase of work is indeed given,
but its value is no longer that of a habitual one. Here then
we have the varied relations of the second case, a vital-
difference of the higher order, characterised by the appear-
ance of a variation in work (term 3).
All that the merchant thinks and does in the time subse-
quent to the receipt of the news, all his action and thought,
is to be taken as dependent upon the very varied and mani-
fold adjustments of system C, which finally annul the variation
which has been introduced—in so far as system C asserts
itself under the diminution of its vital maintenance-value
(term 4). In conclusion, however, such a change is brought
about in system C as actually annuls the variation of work.
Upon this depend* the concluding E-value of the individual
in question : " Thank God, I am safe from the worst".
I have already mentioned that the adjustments of system
C in annulling its changes may be most varied in kind. In
the first volume of the Kritik Avenarius submits them
to a searching investigation. From this I select only
the distinction of changes conceivable in system C into
ectosystematic and endosystematic. Those changes are
called ectosystematic which, though their first phases
occur in system C, complete their course outside of it,
as in movements of the limbs. Those changes are
called endosystematic which take place entirely within
system C. When, for instance, something is lost, the vague
running and searching for it depends upon ectosystematic
changes; the reflective consideration of the circumstances
in which it was mislaid or lost depends upon endosyste-
matic changes. When philosophers try to solve the ques-
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tion as to the "origin of consciousness" by "thought,"
this solution depends upon endosystematic changes; when
the physiologist, on the other hand, institutes jpractical
experiments in reference to this problem, it is by means
of ectosystematic changes that the vital-difference is
annulled.
From his detailed analysis Avenarius gets as the most
important of the endosystematic (i.e., occurring within
system C) adjustments—
(1) Temporary superseding of an unfamiliar kind of change
by a familiar, upon which depends the reduction of the Un-
known to the Known;
(2) Gradual habituation to a kind of change, which in its
original unfamiliarity signified a vital-difference; upon this
depends the gradual • growth into another and originally
strange apprehension ; the Unknown becomes a Known.
(3) Temporary substitution of one kind of change for
another, giving rise to permanent tendency to the mode of
change substituted. Upon this depends the origin of state-
ments which are fixed and unalterable, the so-called True,
the Certain, the Eternal, etc., while at the same time that
which to begin with had been true becomes untrue and un-
certain.
We began by pointing out (what is here again clear) that
the processes of change in the nervous central organ are
analysed by Avenarius not for their own sake only, but
because he aims more especially at establishing the relation
between all human thought and action and those processes.
This I will show by examples for the three groups of
adjustments named above :—
(1) When an individual explains the origin of the sea as
" perspiration of the earth-body," or the likeness of a child
to his deceased father as " inheritance of the soul," we have
within these E-values a reduction of the Unknown to the
Known, and for the process of change in system C a supersed-
ing of an unfamiliar kind of change by a familiar. The
following is another instance of this: Sir J. Lubbock tells us
of the Minatarris that they were greatly astonished when
they saw an American gentleman absorbed in the Nevi York
Commercial Advertiser. As they had never heard of reading
and now saw a newspaper for the first time, they considered
as to what it might be. Thus the newspaper started a vital-
difference in them, to annul which their C-systems passed to
a series of changes. The vital-series thus formed was brief;
it came to an end in one of the savages in the E-value that
the newspaper was a medicinal cloth for sore eyes. Here
462 PRIEDEICH CAESTANJEN :
again, then, we have a superseding of the kinds of change
as explained above.
(2) When in the course of time a strange land becomes
home to the exile, when heathen peoples gradually accustom
themselves to the new Christian faith brought to them by
missionaries, when the discovery—at first so strange—that
the sun stands still and the earth moves round it is at last
accepted as natural and certain, in all such cases we have
an acquisition of E-values, which depends upon the acquisi-
tion of a kind of change which originally signified a variation
of work, and now becomes a familiar exercise of work. Here
we have no kind of superseding, but a mere acceptance.
(3) For the Eleatics the universe, in so far as it is variable,
was " illusion," while in so far as it is invariable they called
it the only " real" and " exclusive Being," and this depends
upon the same substitution of kinds of change as when an
individual begins to regard variable matters and events, the
joys and sorrows of this world, as " empty show" and
"vain trifling," while a religious "ideal," a life after death,
seems to him the only " t rue" "eternal" life. In both
cases we have a substitution of interests directed towards a
" permanent," which is dependent upon a substitution of
kinds of change. We may refer the following instances to
the same gradual formation of a constantly functioning
kind of change: the longing of the Buddhists for Nirvana,
Plato's Eros for absolute being, the longing for salvation of
the earlier Christians, Spinoza's Amor erga rent ceternam et
infinitam, the naturalist's search for generic concepts and
natural laws.
Does not all evolution of science follow the scheme of these
three groups of endosystematic adjustments of the system C?
All these manifestations of human thought-activity, widely
different as they are, all these E-values, are referred by
Avenarius with the greatest ingenuity and acuteness to the
vital-series and their course; in other words, he shows their
dependence upon these. Nay, he even goes further and
says : If the E-values ultimately depend (directly) upon the
changes of system C, then we must also be able to find
groups of E-values which depend upon the particular
characteristics of the changes.
This he does in analogy with the fact of acoustics that, in
talking of sound-notes, particular statements correspond
to quite definite* characteristics of one and the same ex-
ternal motor-process. Thus, e.g., a statement as to its
strength depends only upon the amplitude of the oscillations,
a statement as to its pitch depends upon the number of
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oscillations, and a statement as to its timbre depends upon
the form of oscillation.
But the external motor-process (here the oscillation) is
never more than the indirect condition, and only the internal
motor-process, viz., change-process of the system C, is the
direct condition; hence Avenarius endeavours to show in
the latter also the corresponding characteristics to which
particular statements may be assigned, as values dependent
upon them.
He distinguishes in the change-process of system C the
following characteristics: (1) Form, (2) magnitude, (3) direc-
tion, (4) relevancy (significance), and (5) familiarity. To
these characteristics are assigned definite groups of E-values
which Avenarius calls " fundamental values ". (1) To the
form of the change-process are assigned all statements
which are dependent upon the general sense (sense of
touch, pressure, temperature), and upon the senses of hear-
ing, smell, taste and sight; all, therefore, which Psychology
has hitherto liked to call " sensational quality ". Avenarius
does not use this expression, as for him " sensation " itself is
only an E-value, not a metaphysical something which indi-
viduals merely " have" or " possess," aud which can be
investigated apart from its conditions, i.e., from the appro-
priate changes of system C.1
(2) Next, the E-values of intensity, as, e.g., " strong,"
"weak," are logically assigned to the magnitude of the
change-process.
(3) The statements " pleasure " and " pain " are made to
depend upon the direction of the change-process ; the E-value
"pain" is conditioned by disturbance of the vital main-
tenance-maximum, and the E-value " pleasure" by re-
approach to this maximum.
(4) The relevance of the change-process forms a further
characteristic. This does not depend upon the magnitude
and strength, but upon the significance which the partial
system just affected has for the whole central organ. The
magnitude depends upon the divergence from equilibrium;
the significance, on the other hand, upon natural disposition
and training. According, therefore, as the change-process
affects a partial system which is or is not highly developed
by its disposition and training, it will assume a different value
although the magnitude may be the same. The E-values of
1
 Compare with this important question the article of Jos. Kodis,
Ph.D., "Der Empfindungsbegriff auf einpiriokritischer Grundlage," in
Vierteljahrsschri/t /. wiaserueha/tliche Fhilosophie, 1894, xxL, 4, p.
426 ffi.
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the general emotional attitude, the movement of feeling,
moods, etc., are assigned to the characteristic of varying
relevance as thus described.
(5) The mode in which a change-process is affected by
practice and training is defined as a further characteristic,—
it is called familiarity ; and to this Avenarius assigns those
E-values which are most influenced by habit, i.e., the three
great groups of statements, " real," " known," and " certain,"
with all their variations.
If now, instead of a vital-difference of the first order, one
of a higher order introduces itself, that is, a variation of
work, then the variation of the change-process may have
special reference either to the form, or to the familiarity, or
to the totality of the inner connexions, etc.
(1) In variation of the form we get on the one hand a
deviation from the familiar form, on the other hand a re-
approximation towards it. To these are assigned the groups
of statements expressed in terms like " differently," " in other
manner," etc., and "the same," "in like manner," etc.
(2) When the fa'miliarity of the change-process varies,
then we get the statements which depend upon varied, i.e.,
diminished, familiarity: " less real or not real," " unknown,"
" uncertain," etc.
(3) When the totality of the connexion of the inner change-
processes varies, these latter become more active, more differ-
entiated, more articulated. The progressive perception of
finer details (discrimination) is made dependent upon this—
a most interesting inclusion of the problem of attention in
the general connexion between E-values and the change-
processes of system C. •
Now, readers may ask to what purpose all these classifi-
cations are made. In assigning those great groups of E-
values to certain conditions defined from a merely logical
point of view, Avenarius does not purpose to explain the
content of these E-values, but he is enabled to determine the
general form of their dependence and to find the unit, with-
out which a general view of the world is impossible. He
paves the way—not for the psychologist in the metaphysical
sense—but for the physiologist, who is now confronted with
the task of setting forth what those conditions, which em-
piriocriticism defines in a purely logical manner, really are,
of what physiological processes they consist. Without this
methodological investigation, the physiologist is perplexed,
with superabundance of details, which, however exact they
may be, he is not able to unify.
We must say one word more as to the way in which
BICHAHD AVENAEIUS. 465
Avenarius defines this dependence which I emphasised so
often. If he is to give us a general theory, above all parties
and including all, then here, as in the presupposition from
which he starts, he must keep free from all dogmatic defini-
tions. Hence he says : we know nothing of any mediation
between "physical" and "psychical"; we accept no soul or
reason, no consciousness, as a kind of spiritus rector—we
know nothing of any transition from the physical to the
psychical, but we also know nothing of any principle of
parallelism between the two series of phenomena, nor of any
causal connexion whatever. This all proceeds from special
theory. What we know and have to determine is merely
this: where " psychical values" are found these definite
physiological states are also present, and differences in the
physiological functions of organisms are accompanied by
differences in the psychical values which are stated by the
same individuals.
But to determine this it is quite enough to say: we have
a relation between two terms such that if the one term
alters, then the second alters also. This relation Avenarius
describes, connecting it with the mathematical conception
of function as a logical functional-relation.
By this conception of the logical functional - relation
Avenarius is enabled to avoid completely the conception
of causality, he has no further need of it; and this is the
more advantageous because even causality itself conceals
something dogmatic, something which is not to be found
by pure description.
Here Avenarius agrees also with the well-known physicist
and philosopher of Vienna, Ernst Mach. The latter, in his
Prinzipien der Wdrmclchre, says in an interesting chapter
on Causality and Explanation (p. 433): "When we try to
get rid of the traces of fetishism still adhering to the con-
cept of cause, when we consider that as a rule no one cause
can be assigned, but that a fact is generally determined by a
whole system of conditions, then we are led to relinquish
altogether the concept of cause. It is far better to regard
the conceptually determining elements of a fact as mutually
dependent, in exactly the same sense as does the mathe-
matician, or geometrician." And again on p. 435 he says:
" Only the relation of the actual to the actual has any value,
and this relation is exhausted by description ".
To Avenarius the important point was the methodological
need, that just as we are able to think of the lower organised
nervous systems as functioning without consciousness, so
also we should be able to think of all human doing and
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striving, all action and thought, imagination, hope and love,
without immediately invoking a spirit in explanation.
Of course we cannot demand the proof that certaiu
changes in system C of an individual really take place uith-
ovt consciousness; but then the proof that they take place
with consciousness is also impossible. The proof, however,
is quite unnecessary. All that we are concerned with is,
how we are to think of these changes as happening.
If it is possible to think of the whole infinite manifold of
our action and inaction as taking place without being forced
to introduce a soul, a consciousness, etc., in order to explain
it, then the assumption of this, as of all other faculties,
motive-powers, etc., was a superfluity with which we can
dispense. If we can conceive of all without any insoluble
remainder or contradiction, apart from these metaphysical
factors, and if in doing so we find no trace of the smallest
gap and have no need to revert to them, then these factors
have been a superfluous assumption which we drop, as we
should also drop the atomic and' aether-hypotheses if we
could think of phenomena as taking place otherwise without
contradiction.
But in any case for a general theory of knowledge such as
Avenarius proposed, it was important under no circumstances
to begin with a soul, with a consciousness, with a thought,
loith a will, etc. That were to begin with something un-
known, and to convert an explanatory hypothesis into a
dogma—briefly, to begin at the end.
If, then, we still desire to regard Philosophy as Science—
and that is what we desire—we must begin without the
hypothesis of soul or consciousness as the immediately
certain.
But, it will be asked, is not that what materialism also
does ?
No! There is a difference which must not be overlooked.
For the materialist in beginning without consciousness makes
the denial of it a principle; he establishes a principle, and
thus begins with a dogma concerning the nature of man,
which is just as much unproved as if he should begin with
its opposite.
This was not the procedure of Avenarius. He will at first
say nothing about the nature of man and his " physical " and
" psychical" values; beginning without metaphysical factors
he will establish no principle, only a method. And that is
the great and important difference: For materialism, to
begin without a soul is a principle; for empiriocriticism it
is a method, a method which is justified by the hypothetical
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character of these presuppositions. Nothing is affirmed by
them, and nothing denied; only it is said: We know at
present nothing.
And how if in following this method consistently we finally
arrive at that consciousness or soul, of which at the begin-
ning of our investigations we were obliged to say that we
know nothing ? Why, then it must be so, then both would
have become for us an "immediately certain," upon which
we could take our stand in other investigations. But the
justification of this method will be in no degree impaired by
this ultimate result.
In the first instance then we must confine ourselves to
those changes of state in the nervous central organs upon
which everything is based, the changes and series of changes
in system C. It is from the nature and the states of the
central organ alone that the one simple principle must
ultimately proceed to which we may refer all the most
complicated manifestations of our being, as well as our most
simple movements. And to these changes in system C are
added by the individual those statements (E-values) which
describe the counterpart of that essential co-ordination of
which the central term is the individual himself who makes
the statement.1
Simply to identify the doctrine with Materialism and
Eealism, or to regard it as a variety of these and say that
Avenarius holds a "Psychology without a soul" in the
same way as Fr. Alb. Lange, would be to mistake the very
key-stone of his theory, that generality to which, from his
purely positional standpoint, he attains by his method of
pure description.
To bring this generality well into the foreground I will
here notice the attitude of the Kritik do- reinen Erfahrung to
the book of books, the Bible. For the doctrine of Avenarius,
if it is general, must cover even the views expressed in the
Bible. Avenarius has explained himself on this point in the
Kr. d. r. Erf., vol. ii.( p. 486, note 153.
He say8 there: " If we allow in general the unity of the
plan of creation, then the pre-eminence of my uniform point
of view should also be allowed, even from the standpoint of
the biblical history of creation. If God made man first from
a part of the environment (the dust of the ground) and then
breathed into him the ' breath of life,' then the internal
arrangement of the parts of the system C thus formed was
determined and created before the work of art itself was set
1
 See Avenarius, Der menschliehe Weltbegriff, p. 1*28.
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in motion. Even from this standpoint of the biblical his-
tory of creation, we might first analyse these changes of
system C which are predetermined by its arrangement as
conceivable (hence before we had to regard them as wholly
or partially realised in consequence of the inspiration of the
living breath), and then we might connect these processes
methodically with the manifestations of the ' living soul'
occasioned by the inspiration."
But this is what Avenarius did in his general theory of
knowledge. He first investigated his fellow-men themselves
and their movements and sounds in a purely mechanical
way, purely according to their mechanical significance, but
from a methodological point of view; in this way he obtains
his vital-theory of the changes in system C, and then, but
not sooner, he assigns to them their so-called "psychical"
values, the E-values.
" On the other hand "—Avenarius continues in the same
place—" it agrees both with the uniform plan upon which
system C is based and with the construction of system C,
which is then independent of the 'possession of a conscious-
ness, that under certain conceivable circumstances, not to be
foreseen by the ' created beings,' system C is so arranged
and disposed as to be capable of maintaining itself under
diminution of its vital maintenance-value, whether the
' created being' is in other respects a higher or a lower one.
And this means. . . it must correspond even to the standpoint
of the biblical narrative of creation, that we should be able
to think of all purposive practical or theoretical behaviour
as following one "and the same scheme. So it is, e.g., when
the brainless frog substitutes a more remote movement,
when the one first made and most familiar to him fails of its
result; or when a chained fox, after first trying in vain to
reach with his fore-feet the food which lies too far off, turns
round and gets it with his hind-feet; or when the child
passes to continually new and more complicated movements
to attain the same end; or when a speculative thinker, after
first trying, but always failing, to prove the proposition
' God is the unconditioned, upon which all conditioned must
be based,' finally converts the proposition into the thesis,
' The unconditioned upon which all conditioned is based, I
call God'; or when the mathematician, in order to make
his ' space-intuition ' (or more accurately his ' estimates of
mathematical spatial images') in a corresponding degree
infallible, passes from the objects given by intuition to the
objects given by definition, which objects the mathematician
himself chooses and determines."
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It is well known that all religions are anthropomorphical;
but are not the natural philosophy of to-day, the psychology
of to-day, and all philosophy of to-day, anthropomorphical
also? We speak of the "inertia" of matter, the "resist-
ance " of atoms, the " action " and " re-action " of forces, the
"kindness" and "wisdom" of nature, of the attention
which is " directed" to this or that, of the will which
" leads " us and is the " impulse " of our actions—sensation,
feeling, ideation, and thought—all is made anthropomorphic
and is treated from an animistic point of view, even by the
so-called empiricists.
The hidden ground for this is to be found in the relinquish-
ment of 'the natural concept of the universe, in the division
of the one universe into an inner and an outer world, in the
division of the one course of events into a physical and a
psychical, and in the need of connecting and uniting what
has been artificially separated, the need of finding a mediator
between the universe of " Being " and that of " Thought ".
Avenarius, on the contrary, has succeeded in once more
presenting a view of the universe as one, which corresponds
to theoretical as well as to practical needs. He compre-
hends all our action and thought as E-values, which depend
immediately upon the change-processes in system C, and
mediately upon the change-processes in the component
parts of the environment, of R-values.
If, e.g., I have given to me for investigation the statement
of an individual, " I have the perception blue," I may ap-
proach my task both from the side of the designation and
from the side of that whiek in designated.
If I approach the task from the latter side I find nothing
but R-values, first, the external change-process, the vibration!
of aether, second, the inner change-process, the brain-process.
This mode of regarding what takes place is called the absolute
method. Both processes are measurable events, and have
a chemical or physical significance ; but they differ in that
the external change-process has only this cbemico-physical
significance, while the inner change-process has this and
yet another significance, the meaning, the sense or content.
In referring to the inner change-process, I have turned
from the absolute point of view to another which is called
the relative, because the relation between the individual and
the objects is now discriminated. In this relative point of
view I find nothing but E-values, viz., in this case I do not
mean by " tree " a part of my environment, nor by " blue "
the vibrations of aether, nor by " perception" the brain-
process, but the meaning which the word "tree," "blue,"
3 0 *
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"perception," etc., possesses as its own characteristic mean-
ing in contrast to other meanings. Inasmuch as the relative
point of view cannot but finally become absolute, I may
again regard the relation between the individual and the sur-
roundings (in reference to E-values) in an absolute manner.
The result is, generally and normally, that with the process
in System C, or in a partial system, there is connected by
the continuation and extension of the change-process, a
secondary process in an adjacent partial system. By means
of this secondary and centrally-conditioned process a sound-
complex, which has become firmly associated with the first
process, is either uttered by actual movement of the organs
of speech or brought into recollection; thus we get, in the
first case, the ectosystematic E-value, the verbal denomina-
tion, or, in the latter case, the purely endosystematic E-value.
Therefore the signs or E-values, and that which they
signify—the E-values—may be regarded as coinciding. They
differ only as different modes of viewing the same process ;
and the two modes are not, as might be supposed, distinguished
by their form but by their content; for, fiom the absolute
point of view, we consider only the parts of the environment,
or the individual co-ordinated with them ; from the relative
point of view, we consider, first, the parts of the individual,
secondly, the individual, and thirdly, his statement.
According to this view, which may be constructed directly
from the theory of Avenarius, we have in the statement
" I have the perception blue," a series of signs, of which I
will consider at present only the signs " perception" and
"blue". One of these, the sign "blue," characterises and
describes the object, the counterpart in the essential co-
ordination present, and the external change-process; the
sign "perception" on the other hand characterises and
describes not only this, but also and as well the relation
to the subject, the central term of the present essential
co-ordination and its inner change-process, its momen-
tary re-action in distinction from other conceivable re-
actions, e.tj., "ideation," "recollection," etc. So long as
the individual observes and describes naively, he is content
merely to describe the object, as in the statement " that is
blue"—he does not characterise himself or his specific
activity more accurately because he himself, as the relatively
constant term of the essential co-ordination, is forgotten or
overlooked. It is only when the individual begins to observe
relatively and reflects upon himself as the subject, as well as
upon the object, that he characterises his own activity, his.
own processes in relation and co-ordination to the external
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processes, more exactly as "perception" or as "ideation,"
etc.
In Empiriocriticism, then, we must regard "perception"
as being a sign in just the same way as " blue "—both com-
plexes of sounds are dependent upon a secondary change-
process and enable the individual to characterise in the one
case the external condition, R, in the other the relation of
this R to the constitution of the system at the time in
question. In using these signs the individual does not
intend to say what the external condition of change, or the
object, is in itself (e.g., it is blue in itself, i.e., without
being in the relation of essential co-ordination to an indi-
vidual), nor does he intend by his statement to denote that
he himself brings a subjective faculty (the faculty of per-
ception) to the blue which is present outside. The external
condition of change is not blue in itself, and the individual
has not the perception.
The question as to the object " in-it-self" is absurd, for it
means a question as to an object which is not an object for
any one. " Apart from the logical contradiction of this
question," says Avenarius, "it is also full of contradiction
from the point of view of a general theory of knowledge.
"We may, indeed, think of an environment into which no
human individual has as yet entered; but we cannot think
of any part of this environment, nor any part of any environ-
ment at all, which is not also a counterpart, or what-
is the same, we cannot think ourselves (as central part)
away. What we can do in this respect is either to disregard
ourselves, or to think that at one time no living being was to
be found in the whole world. But in the first case, when we
ignore ourselves, we merely play the part of the unnoticed
spectator; or, if we like, of the spectator who is so absorbed
in looking that he forgets himself in the spectacle. In the
second case, where we assume that at some time there was
no living being in the world, this world still remains for the
questioner the totality of his counterparts — he merely
admits no other central parts (himself, as we have said, he
cannot' think away) to whom his counterparts might also
be counterparts. But for the parts of the environment to
be counterparts it is sufficient that he, the questioner,
continues to be the central part; and that he continues to
be, so long as he still confronts the universe with questions."
. But the other suggestion, that the individual has the per-
ception, is also absurd ; it means that he has the perception
in himself. The individual has indeed his brain in himself,
and in the brain the cortical layers of the cerebrum following
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the outer layer of the neuroglia, and in these the separate
cortical cells, and in these the cell-nuclei, and so on. All
physiological processes and states of the organs and their
parts are in him; but never a perception, sensation, idea, etc.
It is just the same with a thought and with thinking.
Avenarius says expressly : " Analysis of that which is called
' I ' tells us indeed that it has a brain and thoughts, but it
never tells us that the brain has /he thoughts. A thought is
indeed a thought of my Ego; but it is not therefore a
thought of my brain, any more than my brain is the brain
of my thought. That is to say : The brain is not the dwell-
ing-place, seat, producer; it is not the instrument or organ,
not the supporter or substratum, etc., of thought. Thought
is not the inhabitant or commander, not the other half or
side, etc., but neither is it a product; it is not. even a
physiological function, or merely some state of the brain."
All functions of the brain are qualitatively the same, even
as change-processes; they vary only according to form,
magnitude, direction, connexions, etc. "Thought " i s only
the designation and characterisation for the starting of a
change-process, which is not peripherally but centrally con-
ditioned, and which is therefore not a primary occurrence,
but a reproduction ; and " thinking " is only the designation
of the process of combining thoughts in series.
But still the expression, " We have in us perception,
thinking, etc.," may have a true meaning. By the pro-
position " London is on the Thames " I do not mean to say
that the sound-comji/ex "London" is on the Thames, but
" that which is designated as London "; and in the same
way by the proposition " We have in us a thought" I may
mean " We have in us what is designated and characterised
in reference to its specific conditions as ' thought' ". But
that is the change-process specifically determinate by its con-
stitutionand characteristics,and thiswe indubitably have in us.
So long as I mean to say only this and nothing elselam correct.
But that is just what the prevalent Psychology and
Philosophy does not mean to say; it is rather of opinion
that in addition to the physiological process we have some-
thing else in us, a metaphysico-animistic something, by
means of which the physical first becomes, as it is called,
"psychical " ; e.y., a perception by means of which we project
our impressions, a thinking by warns of which we first attain
to thoughts, etc. Knowing how easily our language with
its constant anthropomorphism misleads us into errors,
•Avenarius urges that we should never say that perception,
sensation, thought, consciousness, etc., are in us, but merely
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that change-processes are in the organism, more specifically
in the nervous system, in the central organ, in system C, etc.
On the other hand, Avenarius does not identify change-
processes with " perception," " thought," as the materialist
does, when he follows the well-known saying of Vogt that
thoughts are a secretion of the brain, just as urine is of the
kidneys. When Avenarius analyses from the absolute point
of view that which is designated he is dealing only with the
external and internal change-processes, with their conditions;
when he analyses the designation from a relative point of
view he treats of the significance, the meaning, the con-
tent, which we connect with a word in its dependence
upon certain characteristics of the change-process. Thus
in the second volume of the Kritik he arrives at the
result that by the sign " perception" we mean at bottom
only the same as by the sign "thing," and that by "idea"
we mean the same as by the sign " thought" ; the dis-
tinction in each case is only that by " thing " and " thought"
we characterise the way in which just an B-value exists for
us, while on the other hand by "perception," "idea," we
characterise the way in which an E-value exists just for
us. In the first case the E-value is a " sign" for the
object, in the second a " sign" for the relation of that object
to the subject of the same essential-co-ordination.
Just as the sound-complex " London" is not what is
designated, but is used for what is designated, so also the
E-value " perception " or "red," etc., is not a change-process
of system C and not a change-process in the surrounding.
Indeed we can never say more than " Every E-value is
characterised as that which, at the time of its existence for
the individual, attains to being named ".
It is conceivable that organisms of the lowest kind have
originally only the primary change-processes, which dis-
appear quickly and completely, without leaving any residual
effect. For such beings without any residual effects of
change, the environment would be always strange, however
often it might be presented to them as stimulus. Each
stimulus and each complex of stimuli would be new every
time; they would have no sign by which they might be
distinguished and remembered. Only when the residual
effects of change have been developed and elaborated, and
the secondary processes have arisen through extension to
adjacent cells and subordinate organs of the central organ,
do we get the important circular process, from any point
within which the whole complex of changes may be set in
motion. The possibility of changes which are centrally con-
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ditioned comes first with the residual effects of change and
the secondary processes. There may now be^associated with
the peripherally conditioned process, one whiGh is centrally
conditioned, the repetition of the first eliciting repetition of
the second.
As we say that a sound has content and significance when
we think something in connexion with the sound, so also the
primary change-process receives meaning and content for an
individual from the response of a whole series of secondary
processes, which associate themselves to the primary, and
this association takes place in a definite order. Thus the
E-value is already forthcoming before the sound-complex
is there. In the formation of the sound-complex the same
process fulfils itself once more; sound-complexes themselves
are at bottom only marks for our attention and signs for
a certain order of characteristics. In this pure descrip-
tion we have no need of the "projection theory," etc.
Avenarius never says: "The content of my perception is
there in space, where I see it, 100 paces in front' of me ".
How indeed can one say " I see my perception"? The
content of a statement, e.<j., " red," is never in space ; what
is in space is the R-value, which is characterised for the
individual by the E-value "red". The individual charac-
terises the R-value always by some one aspect (whenever
it actually conditions change in his system C), either by
" red," or " hard," or " real," or " thing," etc. For all these
characterisations we need no " projection," because nothing
at all is projected. The brain-process remains the brain-
process, and the" external condition of change remains the
condition of change; no projection is connected with the
description and naming of the two and their relation.
Concerning the last writing of Avenarius, Der vwnschlichc
Weltlcyriff (Lpz., 1891), I may be allowed to quote a few
words from an essay published by a pupil of Avenarius, Mrs.
D. Josepha Kodis, Ph.D.,in the Psycliulu/jical Review, vol. iii., 6,
p. 609.
"An especially new point in this paper is the theory of
' Introjectiou,' by which Avenarius explains the growth and
formation of the theory that a fundamental difference exists
between the ' inner' and ' outer' experiences. Avenarius
does not find in these two kinds of experience any ' incom-
parability' or any ' fundamental dualism'. The idea of
their essential difference has been derived, according to his
opinion, from a kind of false materialism, which believed in
the enclosure of the soul in the body or in a part of it,
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and, later, in the enclosure of the faculties of the soul in the
soul's substance. From this belief sprang the notion that
the soul was something enclosed from the 'outer world,'
into which enclosure every impression from without could
come only through a putting-in, or ' introjection '. The
whole modern psychology, psycho-physics and most of
philosophical theories contain such opinions, and therefore
serve to strengthen the artificial wall between the inner
and outer experiences which makes the sciences of the
' inner world 'always more inaccessible to exact methods of
investigation, and consequently more sterile."
The Philosophy of Avenarius attracts more and more
attention from thinkers who are striving for new views, and
it gains ground steadily. England still holds aloof from it,
and this is to some extent strange, since it is in England that
we find the origin of the Association Psychology and of a
Common-Sense Philosophy ; it is true that taken as wholes
neither of these has anything to do with Empiriocriticism,
but in detail they would find many of their propositions in
Empiriocriticism. It must not indeed be concealed that
the difficulties of penetrating into Avenarius' works are
very serious, chiefly because of the entirely new terminology
introduced by him.
To those who would make themselves acquainted with
Empiriocriticism, my Einfuhrung in die Kritik der reinen
Evfahrung may perhaps be of use. For other literature
about Avenarius I may draw attention to my " Nachruf " in
the Vierteljahrsschrift fur vrissenschaftliche Philosop/tie, Jahrg.
xx. Heft 4, p. 386 scq. Quite recently there have been added
to these studies two articles by W. Wundt: "Ueber naiven
und kritischen Eealismus," II., " Der Empiriokriticisrnus "
(Philosophische Studien, vol. xiii., pp. 1-105 and pp. 323-433).
The answer to these will soon appear in the Vicrlcljahrssckrift
fiir wissenschaftlirhe Philosophic.
To those philosophical inquirers of to-day who wish to
attain new views, to come forth from the treadmill of
former ways of thought, to be freed from the work of the
Danaides, the eternal carrying of water in a sieve, to these
Empiriocriticism offers a most encouraging inducement,
even if they do not agree (or do not yet agree) with the
particular details of Empiriocriticism, or if they should at
first draw back alarmed by the new, unfamiliar and difficult
terminology. With reference to this point I may close this
sketch with the consoling words of Ernst Much;l " It is from
the new, the unfamiliar, the uncomprehended, that all
stimulus to inquiry proceeds ".
1
 E. Mach, Die Prinzipien der Wdrmelehre, p. 367. Leipzig, 1896.
